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Only the devil and I know the whereabouts of my treasure, and the one of us who lives the longest should take it all.

--Edward Teach, aka, Captain Blackbeard

#### In the 17th and 18th century, pirates joined together on ships to form radically egalitarian and democratic communities free from sovereign control.

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Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité Although the pirates rejected the matrix of state, family and capital this does not mean that their lives had no organizing principles or forms of community. The ever- present threat of death meant that an individual pirate crew had a very tight bond. Their lives literally depended upon each other. Within the context of revenge, how- ever, there is the suggestion of a broader sense of class consciousness and grievance which the pirates sought to realize and redress. Most immediately this entailed the recognition of a common fate with other pirate ships. When they met on the sea, after an inevitable period of uncertainty and suspicion, pirate ships would sometimes greet one another and share news and drink together as when Captain Howell Davis’ and Thomas Cocklyn’s crews met on the Sierra Leone River in April 1719 (Rediker 2004, 94). Blackbeard famously attacked Boston harbour, and deliberately sought out ship- ping from Boston, following the execution of several pirates there (Rediker 2004, 95). Governor Spotswood, well known for hanging pirates, knew full well that if he was caught at sea by pirates their revenge would be certain and bloody. Indeed, Bartholomew Roberts issues a threat to Spotswood to this effect in 1721 (Rediker 2004, 96). In these ways the pirates recognized themselves as ‘brethren of the seas’ a brotherhood that was realized symbolically in the widespread adoption of the Jolly Roger and in their reply, when hailed as to whence they came, ‘from the sea’ (Kuhn 1997, 233). In both these forms of symbolic community, as well as in the pirate cre- ole, full of cursing and nautical terms that constituted the pirates as a distinct lan- guage community, the pirates forged a form of community and mode of belonging that was radically opposed to the dominant ascriptive forms of association based on nationality (Rediker 2004, 97–8). This transnational brotherhood was opposed to more than the monarchy and the state however. As Markus Rediker (1981, 214) puts it: Pirates constructed [their] world in defiant contradistinction to the ways of the world they left behind, in particular to its salient figures of power, the merchant captain and the royal official, and to the system of authority those figures represented and enforced. On board a pirate ship, community or brotherhood was realized as a form of democratic organization and relative equality. Having broken with the hierarchical and legal order of society and nautical discipline, authority on board a pirate ship had no external point of reference. Whilst in some cases this almost certainly led to the emergence of a violent, forceful and autocratic, if also charismatic, leader the evidence is that this was not always, nor even commonly, the case. Whether through force of circumstance or because of the radicalism they inherited from the traditions of radical dissent through the buccaneers, the majority of the pirates of the golden age appear to have managed their shipboard affairs in an open and radically democratic manner. Although there was a pirate captain, he was elected by and answerable to the crew. The captain’s authority was only absolute during battle or in pursuit of a target. At all other times he was subject to challenge and any decision of moment was made by the general council, which consisted of all the pirates on board the ship (Rediker 1981, 209–10). At all times the captain’s power was checked by the quartermaster who played the role of second in command combined with something like an early version of the trade union shop-steward, representing the interests of the crew in all matters and taking the lead in boarding parties as well as in sharing out booty (Cordingly 1995, 119; Rediker 2004, 209–10). When a prize did have a cash value, it was divided up more or less equally between the crew. ‘More’ in the sense that it was much fairer than might be expected aboard a privateer and ‘less’ in that the cap- tain usually received two shares for each of the general crew’s one. A quartermaster might expect one and a half-shares and other specialists or nominal officers might also receive one and a quarter shares. This split was designed to reflect the relative risks and responsibilities of their roles (Cordingly 1995, 118; Rediker 1981, 210). To ensure that the on-board community was in agreement upon a few foundational principles pirate crews drew up a set of ‘articles’ to cover lines of authority and accountability, the division of booty, and other matters of on-board discipline from the settling of interpersonal grievances (usually through an on-shore duel refereed by the quartermaster) to prohibitions on issues such as bringing women or boys on board, drunkenness in combat, gambling, and the rape of female captives (Berg 2001, 225; Cordingly 1995, 120–2; Rediker 2004, 64–76; Johnson 1926, 182–4). By signing up to these articles a sailor joined the pirate community and agreed to the practices that enabled it to be sustained despite the absence of a transcendent law – such as national law or religion – that might impose order from without. In this sense the organization of the pirate ship in the early 18th century was an experiment in radical, anarchistic forms of democratic organizing which were explicitly opposed to the systems of authority on conventional sailing vessels; systems which later provided the model for developments in industrial discipline on the plantation and in the factory (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000, 150). Despite, or perhaps because of, the brevity and dangers of life on board a pirate ship, once a sailor signed the articles he was usually well cared for by the rest of his commu- nity. If a sailor in the Royal or merchant navies sustained an injury, and somehow survived, they were no longer of any use to their employers and were unable to work. Cast out of their ‘chosen’ vocation and unable to support themselves, many injured sailors were thrown into a life as a beggar. One indication of how much the wider pirate community valued their brethren is their development of an early form of industrial injury compensation scheme whereby a given amount of the collective purse would be put aside to recompense an injured pirate for their losses (Johnson 1998, 181; Rediker 2004, 73). If possible, alternative employ would be found for injured crew-members, not least because integration back into mainstream society was nigh-on impossible even if it was desired.

#### In the golden age of piracy, the ocean was a symbol of freedom, a smooth space free from government intrusion and nationalism. Pirates were maritime nomadic marauders that escaped the state through a lens of unintelligibility by travelling between secret coves. They had absolute freedom—no government restrictions preventing them from doing anything, including speaking. Eventually, the rhizomatic space of the sea was ordered and regulated by the government, and the age of piracy ended.

Kuhn 9 Gabriel (Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Innsbruck) Life Under the Jolly Roger: Reflections on Golden Age Piracy <https://thebasebk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Kuhn-Life-Under-the-Jolly-Roger-Reflections-on-Golden-Age-Piracy.pdf> JW

If it is true “that the nomads have no history [but only] a geography,”1 then the question of space deserves particular attention. In the case of Caribbean piracy, this specifically means the sea. Its significance can hardly be overrated. All of Caribbean society has always been intrinsically linked to it: The sea led men to the West Indies, and away from them. A unique fact about the Caribbee islands was that all the inhabitants—Caribs, Arawaks, white planters, merchants, and servants, and black slaves— had arrived by sea in very recent times. To these islands, with their motley populations, merchants and factors came and went with some regularity; they brought craftsmen, servants, and slaves to the West Indies. Communication from one island to another by means of small sloops was both facilitated and obstructed by the incessant trade winds; Barbados lay so far eastward of the Leeward Islands that very little exchange took place. All life, everywhere, depended on wooden hulls: in the outward passage they carried food and supplies of all kinds, and wines from Madeira and the Canaries; on the homeward voyage they took back the island staples and a few passengers.2 This meant ideal conditions for aspiring pirates: “While petty thuggery and brigandage might be easily subdued close to home, these far-flung new trades routes offered a tempting outlet for an entirely different breed of marauder, a mobile and elusive adventurer who could sail to the far ends of the earth, and seek his fortune amid its most lawless frontiers.”3 In general, too, the sea has long been a symbol of freedom, a free space par excellence. Rüdiger Haude calls it “the unlimited, unpredictable space, the negation of everything ‘national.’”4 Marcus Rediker adds: “‘The vast ocean cannot be possessed.’ It was a commons, a place to be used by many, including the sailor who dared to turn pirate.”5 This was especially true as long as those who traveled the seas were dependent on the elements: “The source of power that took them from one haven to the next was everywhere and always available, since it was only the wind.”6 In the terminology of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, the sea constitutes a smooth space, “perhaps the principal among smooth spaces, the hydraulic model par excellence.”7 As they explain: “Smooth space is a field without conduits or channels. A field, a heterogeneous smooth space, is wedded to a very particular type of multiplicity: non-metric, acentered, rhizomatic multiplicities which occupy space without ‘counting’ it.”8 In simpler words, the smooth space is a space for creating self-determined, creative, “free” forms of life. Here, the nomads reach their full potential as raiders: “With practical skill a nomad band can strike, steal, and disappear beyond hope of pursuit in the great waste, fading away without trace … ”9 The supplement to the open space of the sea were the pirates’ coastal refuges, the “many small inlets, lagoons and harbours, … solitary islands and keys.”10 If we stick to the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, we might call this a rhizomatic terrain since a rhizome is “open and connectable in all of its dimensions … it always has multiple entryways.”11 All of the favorite operational areas of the pirates are described accordingly: “the Caribbean islands provided innumerable hiding places, secret coves and uncharted islands;”12 “the Gulf of Honduras and the Mosquito Coast [were] dotted with numerous small islands and protecting reefs, … creeks, lagoons and river-mouths;”13 “the American coast from Boston to Charleston, South Carolina, is a network of river estuaries, bays, inlets, and islands.”14 These coastal labyrinths provided the pirates’ natural onshore environment. “‘As surely as spiders abound where there are nooks and crannies,’ wrote Captain the Hon. Henry Keppel, the great hunter of Oriental pirates in the nineteenth century, ‘so have pirates sprung up wherever there is a nest of islands offering creeks and shallows, headlands, rocks and reefs—facilities in short for lurking, for surprise, for attack, for escape. ’”15 Between the extremes of the wide open sea and the impenetrable coastal mazes of reefs, inlets, and river-mouths, the pirates were able to escape the wrath of the law for several decades.16 Eventually, however, the smooth space of the sea—and with it its coastal boundaries—became “striated,” i.e. ordered, regulated, and controlled. This contributed significantly to the end of golden age piracy: The sea is … of all smooth spaces, the first one attempts were made to striate, to transform into a dependency of the land, with its fixed routes, constant directions, relative movements, a whole counterhydraulic of channels and conduits. One of the reasons for the hegemony of the West was the power … of its State apparatuses to striate the sea by combining technologies of the North and the Mediterranean and by annexing the Atlantic.17 The most tangible aspect of this annexation—or the striating process— was an increased navy presence. The number of permanently employed royal ships in the Americas rose from two in the 1670s to twenty-four by 1700,18 “by 1723, increased surveillance on the sea routes by the Royal Navy was severely limiting [the pirates’] freedom of operations,”19 and by 1724, “the world was becoming too small for a wanted pirate to be able to find a safe hiding place.”20 This coincided with significant technological innovations. As David F. Marley explains: “Steam, advanced ballistics, telegraphic communications and other technological innovations meant that the advantage swung decisively to the professional services.”21 Edward Lucie-Smith stresses the first in particular: “What put an end, in its classic form, to a crime which had existed since history began, was chiefly the coming of steam. Mechanical propulsion, which meant that the men who traveled the oceans were no longer at the mercy of the winds, also removed much of the danger they had hitherto felt from the man who made the wind his ally, and cast himself upon its mercy as the price of an irregular and ferocious independence.”22 Robert C. Ritchie concludes: Ultimately the buccaneers’ success in expanding their geographic range aroused the forces of order and brought the pirates into collision with the demands of empire. The struggle that ensued was lopsided: the resources mobilized by the rising imperial states far exceeded those of the pirates. [This ends a time] when the world was younger, when it was possible for a group of men to seize a ship and sail to the end of the world seeking their fortune, while living in a consensual society free of the constraints that dominated their lives at home.23

#### Vote affirmative to embrace the political strategy of the pirate.

#### Piracy created a nomadic war machine that directly challenged state and capitalist oppression.

Kuhn 9 Gabriel (Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Innsbruck) Life Under the Jolly Roger: Reflections on Golden Age Piracy <https://thebasebk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Kuhn-Life-Under-the-Jolly-Roger-Reflections-on-Golden-Age-Piracy.pdf> JW

Piracy has always been associated with war. e frequency of war refer- ences rivals that of anarchy references. Most famous is Captain Johnson’s repeated declaration that pirates had declared war against all the world.8 Since then, historians have wri en about “the nal ba les of the pirate war on the world,”9 shared the observation that “many perceived piracy as an activity akin to war,”10 or, like Peter Earle, have dedicated the titles of their books to the theme (in this case e Pirate Wars). e French philosopher-psychoanalyst duo Gilles Deleuze and Félix Gua ari introduced the concept of the nomadic war machine in their 1980 book A ousand Plateaus. To them, “the war machine is like the necessary consequence of nomadic organization.”11 It is “exterior to the State apparatus.”12 What is important in their theory is that “the war machine has an extremely variable relation to war itself.”13 It does “not in fact have war as its primary object, but as its second-order, supplementary or synthetic objective, in the sense that it is determined in such way as to destroy the State-form and city-form with which it collides.”14 It is only when the state “appropriates the war machine” that it takes “war for its direct and primary object” and that “war becomes subordinated to the aims of the State.”15 As long as the war machine is in the hands of the nomads, it “has as its object not war, but the tracing of a creative line of flight, the composition of a smooth space and of the movement of people in that space.”16 This last aspect explains the relevance of the concept for the golden age pirates. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, the golden age pirates constituted a nomadic war machine as an inevitable aspect of their struggle for freedom from state and capitalist oppression. The “creative line of flight,” the “composition of a smooth space” and the “movement of people in that space” were all literal aspects of the pirate existence during the golden age. Their war machine did not mean to establish totalitarian orders—it meant to destroy the state and its cronies. In this sense the following rings very true: Each time there is an operation against the State—subordination, rioting, guerilla warfare or revolution as act—it can be said that a war machine has revived, that a new nomadic potential has appeared, accompanied by the reconstitution of a smooth space or a manner of being in space as though it were smooth....It is in this sense that the response of the State against all that threatens to move beyond it is to striate space.17

#### Before the omnipresent technology of the 21st century, truly autonomous zones free from government control were entirely possible and actualized by pirate coves—creating anarchist mini-utopias that rejected all forms of government intervention. While these spaces are not presently possible, we should reclaim certain sites as Temporary Autonomous Zones to allow true rejection of oppression. The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best actualizes a Temporary Autonomous Zone within debate.

Bey 91 Hakim (pseudonym under which Peter Lamborn Wilson writes) “T. A. Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism” 1991 <http://hermetic.com/bey/taz3.html#labelTAZ> JW

Pirate Utopias THE SEA-ROVERS AND CORSAIRS of the 18th century created an "information network" that spanned the globe: primitive and devoted primarily to grim business, the net nevertheless functioned admirably. Scattered throughout the net were islands, remote hideouts where ships could be watered and provisioned, booty traded for luxuries and necessities. Some of these islands supported "intentional communities," whole mini-societies living consciously outside the law and determined to keep it up, even if only for a short but merry life. Some years ago I looked through a lot of secondary material on piracy hoping to find a study of these enclaves--but it appeared as if no historian has yet found them worthy of analysis. (William Burroughs has mentioned the subject, as did the late British anarchist Larry Law--but no systematic research has been carried out.) I retreated to primary sources and constructed my own theory, some aspects of which will be discussed in this essay. I called the settlements "Pirate Utopias." Recently Bruce Sterling, one of the leading exponents of Cyberpunk science fiction, published a near-future romance based on the assumption that the decay of political systems will lead to a decentralized proliferation of experiments in living: giant worker-owned corporations, independent enclaves devoted to "data piracy," Green-Social-Democrat enclaves, Zerowork enclaves, anarchist liberated zones, etc. The information economy which supports this diversity is called the Net; the enclaves (and the book's title) are Islands in the Net. The medieval Assassins founded a "State" which consisted of a network of remote mountain valleys and castles, separated by thousands of miles, strategically invulnerable to invasion, connected by the information flow of secret agents, at war with all governments, and devoted only to knowledge. Modern technology, culminating in the spy satellite, makes this kind of autonomy a romantic dream. No more pirate islands! In the future the same technology-- freed from all political control--could make possible an entire world of autonomous zones. But for now the concept remains precisely science fiction--pure speculation. Are we who live in the present doomed never to experience autonomy, never to stand for one moment on a bit of land ruled only by freedom? Are we reduced either to nostalgia for the past or nostalgia for the future? Must we wait until the entire world is freed of political control before even one of us can claim to know freedom? Logic and emotion unite to condemn such a supposition. Reason demands that one cannot struggle for what one does not know; and the heart revolts at a universe so cruel as to visit such injustices on our generation alone of humankind. To say that "I will not be free till all humans (or all sentient creatures) are free" is simply to cave in to a kind of nirvana-stupor, to abdicate our humanity, to define ourselves as losers. I believe that by extrapolating from past and future stories about "islands in the net" we may collect evidence to suggest that a certain kind of "free enclave" is not only possible in our time but also existent. All my research and speculation has crystallized around the concept of the TEMPORARY AUTONOMOUS ZONE (hereafter abbreviated TAZ). Despite its synthesizing force for my own thinking, however, I don't intend the TAZ to be taken as more than an essay ("attempt"), a suggestion, almost a poetic fancy. Despite the occasional Ranterish enthusiasm of my language I am not trying to construct political dogma. In fact I have deliberately refrained from defining the TAZ--I circle around the subject, firing off exploratory beams. In the end the TAZ is almost self-explanatory. If the phrase became current it would be understood without difficulty...understood in action. Waiting for the Revolution HOW IS IT THAT "the world turned upside-down" always manages to Right itself? Why does reaction always follow revolution, like seasons in Hell? Uprising, or the Latin form insurrection, are words used by historians to label failed revolutions--movements which do not match the expected curve, the consensus-approved trajectory: revolution, reaction, betrayal, the founding of a stronger and even more oppressive State--the turning of the wheel, the return of history again and again to its highest form: jackboot on the face of humanity forever. By failing to follow this curve, the up-rising suggests the possibility of a movement outside and beyond the Hegelian spiral of that "progress" which is secretly nothing more than a vicious circle. Surgo--rise up, surge. Insurgo--rise up, raise oneself up. A bootstrap operation. A goodbye to that wretched parody of the karmic round, historical revolutionary futility. The slogan "Revolution!" has mutated from tocsin to toxin, a malign pseudo-Gnostic fate-trap, a nightmare where no matter how we struggle we never escape that evil Aeon, that incubus the State, one State after another, every "heaven" ruled by yet one more evil angel. If History IS "Time," as it claims to be, then the uprising is a moment that springs up and out of Time, violates the "law" of History. If the State IS History, as it claims to be, then the insurrection is the forbidden moment, an unforgivable denial of the dialectic--shimmying up the pole and out of the smokehole, a shaman's maneuver carried out at an "impossible angle" to the universe. History says the Revolution attains "permanence," or at least duration, while the uprising is "temporary." In this sense an uprising is like a "peak experience" as opposed to the standard of "ordinary" consciousness and experience. Like festivals, uprisings cannot happen every day--otherwise they would not be "nonordinary." But such moments of intensity give shape and meaning to the entirety of a life. The shaman returns--you can't stay up on the roof forever-- but things have changed, shifts and integrations have occurred--a difference is made. You will argue that this is a counsel of despair. What of the anarchist dream, the Stateless state, the Commune, the autonomous zone with duration, a free society, a free culture? Are we to abandon that hope in return for some existentialist acte gratuit? The point is not to change consciousness but to change the world. I accept this as a fair criticism. I'd make two rejoinders nevertheless; first, revolution has never yet resulted in achieving this dream. The vision comes to life in the moment of uprising--but as soon as "the Revolution" triumphs and the State returns, the dream and the ideal are already betrayed. I have not given up hope or even expectation of change--but I distrust the word Revolution. Second, even if we replace the revolutionary approach with a concept of insurrection blossoming spontaneously into anarchist culture, our own particular historical situation is not propitious for such a vast undertaking. Absolutely nothing but a futile martyrdom could possibly result now from a head- on collision with the terminal State, the megacorporate information State, the empire of Spectacle and Simulation. Its guns are all pointed at us, while our meager weaponry finds nothing to aim at but a hysteresis, a rigid vacuity, a Spook capable of smothering every spark in an ectoplasm of information, a society of capitulation ruled by the image of the Cop and the absorbant eye of the TV screen. In short, we're not touting the TAZ as an exclusive end in itself, replacing all other forms of organization, tactics, and goals. We recommend it because it can provide the quality of enhancement associated with the uprising without necessarily leading to violence and martyrdom. The TAZ is like an uprising which does not engage directly with the State, a guerilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State can crush it. Because the State is concerned primarily with Simulation rather than substance, the TAZ can "occupy" these areas clandestinely and carry on its festal purposes for quite a while in relative peace. Perhaps certain small TAZs have lasted whole lifetimes because they went unnoticed, like hillbilly enclaves--because they never intersected with the Spectacle, never appeared outside that real life which is invisible to the agents of Simulation. Babylon takes its abstractions for realities; precisely within this margin of error the TAZ can come into existence. Getting the TAZ started may involve tactics of violence and defense, but its greatest strength lies in its invisibility--the State cannot recognize it because History has no definition of it. As soon as the TAZ is named (represented, mediated), it must vanish, it will vanish, leaving behind it an empty husk, only to spring up again somewhere else, once again invisible because undefinable in terms of the Spectacle. The TAZ is thus a perfect tactic for an era in which the State is omnipresent and all-powerful and yet simultaneously riddled with cracks and vacancies. And because the TAZ is a microcosm of that "anarchist dream" of a free culture, I can think of no better tactic by which to work toward that goal while at the same time experiencing some of its benefits here and now. In sum, realism demands not only that we give up waiting for "the Revolution" but also that we give up wanting it. "Uprising," yes--as often as possible and even at the risk of violence. The spasming of the Simulated State will be "spectacular," but in most cases the best and most radical tactic will be to refuse to engage in spectacular violence, to withdraw from the area of simulation, to disappear. The TAZ is an encampment of guerilla ontologists: strike and run away. Keep moving the entire tribe, even if it's only data in the Web. The TAZ must be capable of defense; but both the "stv rike" and the "defense" should, if possible, evade the violence of the State, which is no longer a meaningful violence. The strike is made at structures of control, essentially at ideas; the defense is "invisibility," a martial art, and "invulnerability"--an "occult" art within the martial arts. The "nomadic war machine" conquers without being noticed and moves on before the map can be adjusted. As to the future--Only the autonomous can plan autonomy, organize for it, create it. It's a bootstrap operation. The first step is somewhat akin to satori--the realization that the TAZ begins with a simple act of realization.

#### Micro-fascism structures other forms of oppression by operating on the individual body to produce overall systems of domination.

Deleuze and Guatarri 80 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari “A Thousand Plateus” pp. 214-215

It is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by a rigid segmentarity with compartmentalization of contiguous offices, an office manager in each segment, and the corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole bureaucratic segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a bureaucratic perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced even against administrative regulations. If Kafka is the greatest theorist of bureaucracy, it is because he shows how, at a certain level (but which one? it is not localizable), the barriers between offices cease to be "a definite dividing line" and are immersed in a molecular medium (milieu) that dissolves them and simultaneously makes the office manager proliferate into microfigures impossible to recognize or identify, discernible only when they are centralizable: another regime, coexistent with the separation and totalization of the rigid segments.I0 We would even say that fascism implies a molecular regime that is distinct both from molar segments and their centralization. Doubtless, fascism invented the concept of the totalitarian State, but there is no reason to define fascism by a concept of its own devising: there are totalitarian States, of the Stalinist or military dictatorship type, that are not fascist. The concept of the totalitarian State applies only at the macropohtical level, to a rigid segmentarity and a particular mode of totalization and centralization. But fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State. Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran's fascism, fascism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school, and office: every fascism is defined by a micro-black hole that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized central black hole.1 ' There is fascism when a war machine is installed in each hole, in every niche. Even after the National Socialist State had been established, microfascisms persisted that gave it unequaled ability to act upon the "masses." Daniel Guerin is correct to say that if Hitler took power, rather then taking over the German State administration, it was because from the beginning he had at his disposal microorganizations giving him "an unequaled, irreplaceable ability to penetrate every cell of society," in other words, a molecular and supple segmentarity, flows capable of suffusing every kind of cell. Conversely, if capitalism came to consider the fascist experience as catastrophic, if it preferred to ally itself with Stalinist totalitarianism, which from its point of view was much more sensible and manageable, it was because the egmentarity and centralization of the latter was more classical and less fluid. What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism. American film has often depicted these molecular focal points; band, gang, sect, family, town, neighborhood, vehicle fascisms spare no one. Only microfascism provides an answer to the global question: Why does desire desire its own repression, how can it desire its own repression? The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do they "want" to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they tricked by an ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from microforma-tions already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Desire is never an undifferentiated instinctual energy, but itself results from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions: a whole supple segmentarity that processes molecular energies and potentially gives desire a fascist determination. Leftist organizations will not be the last to secrete microfascisms. It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective. Four errors concerning this molecular and supple segmentarity are to be avoided. The first is axiological and consists in believing that a little suppleness is enough to make things "better." But microfascisms are what make fascism so dangerous, and fine segmentations are as harmful as the most rigid of segments. The second is psychological, as if the molecular were in the realm of the imagination and applied only to the individual and interindividual. But there is just as much social-Real on one line as on the other. Third, the two forms are not simply distinguished by size, as a small form and a large form; although it is true that the molecular works in detail and operates in small groups, this does not mean that it is any less coextensive with the entire social field than molar organization. Finally, the qualitative difference between the two lines does not preclude their boosting or cutting into each other; there is always a proportional relation between the two, directly or inversely proportional.

#### Actions that striate smooth spaces constitute intellectual and physical violence—the real world is fluid, not static.

Hipwell 4 William Hipwell (Professor of Geography, Kyungpook National University, South Korea) “A Deleuzian critique of resource-use management politics in Industria) The Canadian Geographer 48, no. 3, 2004

For Deleuze, static identities are dangerous illusions: the real world is, by contrast, always fluid and mobile; reality is ontologically characterised by ‘difference’. This difference is not, as it might seem, difference between things (an identitarian notion) but rather the idea that reality is a continuum of interplay, interpenetration and interconnectedness and that ‘things’ are merely intensities in this continuum, internally constituted by the interplay of different forces, and themselves interacting and interpenetrating with everything around them. In this sense, allegedly separate entities are mutually constitutive and interdependent, and treating them as entirely separate inevitably does intellectual and physical violence to the world. In an ontology of difference, the world is viewed holistically. Differential being is defined on the basis of what it is rather than what it is not. It is dynamic, not static. As Deleuze (1988, 123) puts it, ‘the important thing is to understand life, each living individuality, not as a form, or a development of form, but as a complex relation between different velocities’. While we may, for practical purposes, speak of ‘a tree’, ‘a fish’, ‘the human species’, etc., awareness of ontological difference reminds us that it is a mistake to abstract such things from their dynamic and continuous context. Prior to striation by identitarian forces, the world is made of ‘smooth space’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 474–500), or what Patton (2000, 112) has called ‘the heterogeneous space of qualitative multiplicity’. In smooth space, diverse and unexpected interconnections may appear and reconfigure (‘lines of flight’). Smooth space is continually in flux; it is difficult to know intellectually and (therefore) difficult to control. To know one’s way in the tangle of The Canadian Geographer / Le Ge´ographe canadien 48, no 3 (2004) 360 William T. Hipwell primeval forest or other ‘wild zones’ (Dalby 2001), one must have good instincts.

#### My argument isn’t that we should act just like pirates. The 1AC’s politics does not claim ownership of the pirates, but uses their legacy as an inspiration for a movement. This debate does not end after the round, the question of exclusion and fascism within our community should continue inside and outside the round.

Kuhn 9 Gabriel (Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Innsbruck) Life Under the Jolly Roger: Reflections on Golden Age Piracy <https://thebasebk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Kuhn-Life-Under-the-Jolly-Roger-Reflections-on-Golden-Age-Piracy.pdf> JW

In short, the golden age pirates are not “ours”—but their legacy is ours to take. The radical and revolutionary aspects of golden age piracy have to be teased out and applied to contemporary radical and revolutionary politics. Such an approach seems liberating in fact. By not claiming ownership or “true representation” of the golden age pirates, quite a few rather trite—and in the end often pointless—arguments can be avoided: whether they were more violent than merchant captains, whether the Africans on their ships were crew members or slaves, whether they had an anti-capitalist consciousness or not, etc. Instead, we can focus our energies on proving the radical and revolutionary aspects of golden age piracy by bringing them alive in our politics. And this too would probably satisfy at least some of the pirates who, we can safely assume, would rather continue to provide sparks of freedom than survive as mere objects of history. Unconditionally embracing the golden age pirates as role models for radical politics has repeatedly been questioned in this book. The reasons might be summed up by focusing on the two most central problems: 1. The golden age pirates lacked a wider ethical and political perspective. Pirates were, in the end, mainly concerned with their own well-being. They failed, as Chris Land puts it, “to offer a … vision of a new political-economic order.”10 This of course leads us back to century-old discussions about “individualism vs. collectivism/socialism.” There seems little point in revisiting these discussions here. However, abandoning any commitment to making life better for all seems hard to accept for a radical political movement. Individualist theories of liberation stressing the need to liberate yourself (and the rest will follow) build on a strict dichotomy between the individual and society that, in the end, only serves capitalism and the state, as it undermines the collective effort necessary to bring about the fundamental social change needed to free us all. The individual cannot exist without society nor can society exist without the individual. Neither form of liberation—individual or collective—is superior to the other. They are one and the same. Trying to separate them will doom our struggle to failure. In fact, the golden age pirates might be a case in point. 2. The golden age pirates lacked a level of coordination that could have allowed for establishing a sustainable counterculture and an effective communal defense against their enemies. The golden age pirates did share a common culture that implied solidarity and feelings of collective identity but this never translated into the kind of concrete network that would have been necessary to sustain their nomadic, libertarian and independent lifestyle in the face of the powers that came after them. It is worth quoting two historians at length whose observations sum this up very convincingly. Kenneth J. Kinkor writes: Unable to mobilize their own full strength, as well as the potential support of other oppressed segments of the society they had rejected, the eighteenth-century pirates were, at their strongest, a tenuous collection of loosely linked, amorphous, floating commonwealths surviving only by predation on the very societies from which they had divorced themselves. ‘Inability to disengage themselves fully from their enemy was the Achilles heel of maroon societies throughout the Americas.’ While discipline and centralized authority helped landbased maroon societies survive, and even flourish, the central feature and paramount attraction of piracy was its libertarian character. It is a profound irony that it was, in part, the pirates’ own thirst for freedom which doomed them in an ‘aimless rebellion [which] ended by suppressing itself.’11 In the same vein, Marcus Rediker explains: Pirates themselves unwittingly took a hand in their own destruction. From the outset, theirs had been a fragile social world. They produced nothing and had no secure place in the economic order. They had no nation, no home; they were widely dispersed; their community had virtually no geographic boundaries. Try as they might, they were unable to create reliable mechanisms through which they could either replenish their ranks or mobilize their collective strength. These deficiencies of social organization made them, in the long run, relatively easy prey.12 It is enlightening to return once more to the theorists of guerrilla warfare in this context. Let us compare the following observations of Che Guevara and Mao Tse-Tung with the analyses above. Guevara writes: The guerrilla army comprises all the people of a region or a country. That is the reason for its strength and for its eventual victory over whatsoever power tries to crush it; that is, the base and grounding of the guerrilla is the people. One cannot imagine small armed groups, no matter how mobile and familiar with the terrain, surviving the organized persecution of a well-equipped army without this powerful assistance. The test is that all bandits, all brigand gangs, eventually succumb to the central power.13 Mao states: Ability to fight a war without a rear is a fundamental characteristic of guerrilla action, but this does not mean that guerrillas can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas. History shows us many examples of … revolts that were unsuccessful, and it is fanciful to believe that such movements, characterized by banditry and brigandage, could succeed in [an] era of improved communications and military equipment.14 It is not only the lack of social organization that has been named as a reason for the pirates’ inability to resist the authorities’ attack. Edward Lucie- Smith is but one who has argued that “what mitigated against the long continuation of piracy on the grand scale was not so much the success of the authorities in dealing with it as the inherent weakness of pirate society. Perhaps more pirates died of drink and disease than were ever imprisoned or hanged. … Many ships were wrecked, rather than sunk or captured.”15 Some passages from Captain Johnson’s volumes seem to confirm this. One pirate crew is described as having lost “their captain and thirty men, by the distemper they contracted,”16 while another “lost 70 men by their excesses; having been long without fresh provision, the eating immoderately, drinking toke (a liquor made of honey) to excess and being too free with the women, they fell into violent fevers which carried them off.”17 Marcus Rediker has pointed to another aspect that helps explain the golden age pirates’ failure to generate a long-lasting community. It seems trivial yet persuasive: “By limiting the role of women aboard their ships, pirates may have made it more difficult to reproduce themselves as a community and hence easier for the state to wage its deadly assault upon them.”18 The observation reflects Hobsbawm’s verdict on the haiduks: “Haiduks were always free men, but in the typical case of the Balkan haiduks they were not free communities. For the četa or band, being essentially a voluntary union of individuals who cut themselves off from their kin, was automatically an abnormal social unit, since it lacked wives, children and land.”19 Finally, there is the question of economic sustainability which the golden age pirates had no provisions for. In Chris Land’s words: “The pirates of the golden age appear to have had no vision of an alternative political economy and their uprising would have failed had it brought an end to the Atlantic trade.”20 In the final analysis, this rendered their “anti-capitalist” activities ineffective: “The pirates did little to overthrow the power of the European, colonial states or the global flows of capitalist accumulation.”21 However, as has been argued consistently throughout this volume, the impossibility of embracing golden age pirates as radical role models does not render them insignificant for contemporary radical politics. In fact, the ways in which golden age pirates can inform these are multifold: 1. The golden age pirates are sources of inspiration. When Eric Hobsbawm writes that the “tragedy” of the bandits was that their “contribution to modern revolutions was … ambiguous, doubtful and short [because] as bandits they could at best, like Moses, discern the promised land,”22 the assumption that this was a tragedy may be challenged. It does not necessarily seem tragic to “discern the promised land.” In fact, it might rather be a remarkable achievement. As Marcus Rediker succinctly puts it, the pirates “dared to imagine a different life, and they dared to try to live it.”23 If there is no inspirational momentum in such a venture, where can inspirational momentum come from? Frank Sherry’s conclusion seems apt: “Clearly the brigands of Madagascar and New Providence still speak to us. They tell us, even across the centuries, that if men are denied the chance to live in freedom, they will make their own freedom, even if the specific shape of that freedom may not be beautiful or idealistic.”24 We ought also consider Anton Gill’s insightful interpretation of William Dampier’s attraction to the logwood cutters in the Bay of Campeche: “They were free men, and it was the freedom of their way of living, not the way they lived, that appealed to Dampier.”25 2. The golden age pirates’ forms of social organizing imply potential for revolutionary organizing. Eric Hobsbawm concedes that there are “two things” that can turn the “modest, if violent, social objective of bandits … into genuine revolutionary movements”:26 one, to become “a symbol, even the spearhead, of resistance;”27 and two, to evoke the “human life dream of … a world of equality, brotherhood and freedom, a totally new world without evil.”28 The golden age pirates became such a symbol and they evoked such a dream—and it is this momentum that contemporary radicals have to invigorate. The three most concrete aspects in which such momentum manifested itself during the golden age were: One, anti-authoritarianism, or the abovementioned “proto-individualist-anarchist attitude” with which “a pirate entered the political spheres of anarchist organization and festival.”29 Two, defiance, which seems best illustrated by yet another comparison to Hobsbawm’s social bandit: “He is an outsider and a rebel, a poor man who refuses to accept the normal roles of poverty, and establishes his freedom by means of the only resources within reach of the poor, strength, bravery, cunning and determination. This draws him close to the poor: he is one of them.”30 And three, internal democracy and egalitarianism, which created “an alternative to the appalling conditions under which ordinary seamen had to live.”31 Rediker summarizes this as follows: The early-eighteenth-century pirate ship was a ‘world turned upside down,’ made so by the articles of agreement that established the rules and customs of the pirates’ social order. … Pirates distributed justice, elected officers, divided loot equally, and established a different discipline. They limited the authority of the captain, resisted many of the practices of the capitalist merchant shipping industry, and maintained a multicultural, multiracial, multinational social order. They sought to prove that ships did not have to be run in the brutal and oppressive ways of the merchant service and the Royal Navy.32 That all three of these aspects had a high political significance cannot only be deduced from Hobsbawm’s concession that a bandit “forms a nucleus of armed strength, and therefore a political force,”33 but also from the authorities’ reactions at the time. Even if the defense of commercial interests was a prime motivation for embarking on their crusade against the pirates, there was more to it. The golden age pirates did pose a political threat as well. Partly due to the inherently political character of commerce which rendered the pirates’ attacks on merchant ships, as Janice E. Thomson puts it, “a protest against the obvious use of state institutions to defend property and discipline labor,”34 but partly also because the golden age pirates brought to mind the realistic possibility of an alternative way of life. As Marcus Rediker states, “the more that pirates built and enjoyed the merry, autonomous existence the more determined the authorities grew to destroy them.”35 3. There is a libidinal dimension to the golden age pirates’ revolt that has proven essential in liberatory politics throughout the ages. This dimension of the pirate protest is closely tied to Nietzsche’s vitalism and Dionysian philosophy. It is one that no subversive movement wanting to sustain itself and attract new comrades can forgo. Stephen Snelders says it well: “The social rebellion involved in piracy resembles the instinctive and violent social rebellion of Bonnie and Clyde: as much concerned with having a good time as with shooting down the enemy.”36 4. The golden age pirates, their actions, their lore and their imagery form the backdrop to various effective radical interventions in contemporary politics. Chris Land’s essay “Flying the Black Flag” does a wonderful job relating golden age piracy to current political activism—and distinguishing these relations from commercial ones. As Land points out: “So long as people keep consuming piracy—rather than practicing it—then capitalism won’t have a problem. But if people started actually engaging in piracy, Disney would be one of the first up in arms.”37 There are a number of examples in which the “more oppositional and insurgent figure of piracy”38 and its “subversive tradition”39 shows itself today and proves that “the pirates’ political legacy has been long lasting and has made a significant contribution to the development of the contemporary culture of radical, anti-capitalist and anarchist dissent.”40 a) There is the strong tradition of the Temporary Autonomous Zone that the golden age pirates—among many others—have been part of.41 This tradition manifests itself today from underground social centers to squats, radical neighborhoods, open cyberspaces, intentional communities, self-controlled workshops, independent indigenous communities, free festivals, or roaming groups of wanderers and travelers. All of them, as much as the golden age pirates, confirm that, at least temporarily, a life of “freedom, equality, harmony, and abundance”42 through practical experiment is possible. They “make some part of the myth real, if only for a short time.”43

# 1AR Frontlines

## Extensions

Piracy is a good model for resisting all forms of violence—you should vote affirmative to embrace it as a strategy. Because pirates didn’t belong to any national category, they were inclusive of all groups and formed radically egalitarian and democratic communities. That’s Land 7.

The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best actualizes a Temporary Autonomous Zone within debate. Pirate utopias are no longer possible on a large scale because of satellites, but we can still create temporary anarchist utopias like debate, which inherently has no rules. This is the largest impact—without spaces where we can be ourselves and experiment radically and creatively, we’re doomed to a lifetime of order and regulation with no freedom. That’s Bey 91.

The ocean is a perfect rhizome—endless blue, no natural striations or conduits, which is what allowed radical pirate culture to emerge. The Golden Age of Piracy ended once the Royal British Navy ordered the smooth space. That’s Kuhn 9. This impact turns T—their speech act attempts to order and regulate the debate space, which naturally is smooth and has no rules just like the ocean. Their static understanding of how we should engage destroys agency and inhibits radical resistance to normalizing methods of thought which structures other forms of violence. That’s Hipwell 4.

Micro-fascism causes every impact—it structures all oppressive systems and allows them to permeate individual life and demand obedience to an overall system. That’s Deleuze and Guattari 80. This takes out state good because it proves that oppression cannot be reduced on the governmental level, only on the person. I control the root cause of your impacts—their alternate method can’t explain why people can desire their own repression- that means only changing individual mindsets can solve any impact.

## AT: Topicality

### C/I

#### Counter interpretation: aff’s don’t need to be topical on the January/February 2017 topic as long as they specifically implicate their method in terms of favoring free speech.

#### I meet. The 1AC speaks to how we should attack the police instead of reform them.

#### 1. Solves their offense—it’s still predictable because I talk about free speech. You get state good and Ks of Deleuze, which everyone has.

#### 2. The aff impact turns theory. Framework mirrors the Royal British Navy’s attempt to striate smooth spaces. This explanation was done on case. They structure debate to fall into a rigid set of rules, which inhibits creativity and kills value to life. That’s Bey 91.

#### 3. This topic sucks—way too narrow and virtually no studies. That means departing from it in this specific instance is the only way to create some form of education.

#### 4. Critical education. Current debate under their interp is meaningless. Empirically, all rounds devolve to theory, over-simplified Ks and absurd extinction scenarios with missing internal links.

#### 5. Our two methods aren’t mutually exclusive. Sometimes I defend normal policy affs, so my counter-interp only adds more forms of education and there’s no educational reason that we have to advocate for the USFG every round.

#### 6. Fairness. You exclude individuals who don’t want to participate in a topical discussion, which is worse than making it slightly harder to negate because they can’t access this space.

### AT: Decision-Making Skills

#### 1. It’s a debate – no matter what I say, the neg will disagree; the structure guarantees we won’t unproductively agree which solves

#### 2. Debating about pirates is key to decision-making in the real world when we decide how to live a valuable life free from government intrusion.

#### 3. Pirate debates are key to decision-making. They were incredibly democratic and allowed all voices to participate—that’s the best form of education. That’s Land 7 from the AC.

### AT: Limits

#### 1. Unpredictability is good. That’s Kuhn 9—pirates were completely unpredictable because they travelled between secret coves. If they had become predictable, the state would have crushed their movement and caused oppression—unintelligibility is key.

#### 2. Inevitable—affs break new advantages, plans, and frameworks regardless, I’m only a small decrease in predictability.

#### 3. Predictability is a choice – they chose what to research, and the counter-interp would make my aff a norm on the topic.

### AT: Ground

#### 1. You can critique the aff methodology. The 1AC six minutes of saying a lot of things with representational implications.

#### 2. TURN—free speech is incredibly side biased against neg and there are only two disads. The aff opens up neg ground uniquely.

#### 3. Education outweighs. It’s the reason we do debate and provides portable skills for the real world.

### AT: Policymaking Good/Roleplaying/Cede the Political

#### 1. No impact. We are debaters in a room and virtually none of us will become policymakers. If we become policymakers, we would get your education in grad school which solves.

#### 2. Engagement with political spaces is bad—we need a temporary autonomous zone free from government control to preserve value to life. That’s Bey 91.

### AT: Switch Side Debate

#### 1. The neg doesn’t switch sides. They’ll never read an interesting pirates K on the neg. They probably don’t even read switch side bad.

#### 2. Topical debate don’t solves – phil debaters read Kant on both sides regardless, but K affs force non-K debaters to read Ks, which is better for switch-side.

#### 3. Switch-side destroys debate’s value.

Greene and Hicks 5 (Ronald Walter and Darrin, Insert Quals. “Lost convictions”. Cultural Studies. Volume 19, Issue 1. InformaWorld. <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a738568563&fulltext=713240928>)

While the opposition to debating both sides probably reaches back to the challenges against the ancient practice of dissoi logoi, we want to turn our attention to the unique cultural history of debate during the Cold War. In the midst of Joseph McCarthy’s impending censure by the US Senate, the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy and, subsequently, all of the teacher colleges in the state of Nebraska refused to affirm the resolution 􏰀/ ‘Resolved: The United States should diplomatically recognize the People’s Republic of China’. Yet, switch-side debating remained the national standard, and, by the fall of 1955, the military academies and the teacher colleges of Nebraska were debating in favour of the next resolution. Richard Murphy (1957), however, was not content to let the controversy pass without comment. Murphy launched a series of criticisms that would sustain the debate about debate for the next ten years. Murphy held that debating both sides of the question was unethical because it divorced conviction from advocacy and that it was a dangerous practice because it threatened the integrity of public debate by divorcing it from a genuine search for truth. ¶ Murphy’s case against the ethics of debating both sides rested on what he thought to be a simple and irrefutable rhetorical principle: A public utterance is a public commitment. In Murphy’s opinion, debate was best imagined as a species of public speaking akin to public advocacy on the affairs of the day. If debate is a form of public speaking, Murphy reasoned, and a public utterance entails a public commitment, then speakers have an ethical obligation to study the question, discuss it with others until they know their position, take a stand and then 􏰀/ and only then 􏰀/ engage in public advocacy in favour of their viewpoint. Murphy had no doubt that intercollegiate debate was a form of public advocacy and was, hence, rhetorical, although this point would be severely attacked by proponents of switch-side debating. Modern debating, Murphy claimed, ‘is geared to the public platform and to rhetorical, rather than dialectical principles’ (p. 7). Intercollegiate debate was rhetorical, not dialectical, because its propositions were specific and timely rather than speculative and universal. Debaters evidenced their claims by appeals to authority and opinion rather than formal logic, and debaters appealed to an audience, even if that audience was a single person sitting in the back of a room at a relatively isolated debate tournament. As such, debate as a species of public argument should be held to the ethics of the platform. We would surely hold in contempt any public actor who spoke with equal force, and without genuine conviction, for both sides of a public policy question. Why, asked Murphy, would we exempt students from the same ethical obligation?

### AT: Dogmatism

#### No link. My counter interp means people will read lots of different affs and we’ll have to challenge methods we might agree with.

### AT: TVA

#### There is no topical version of the aff—we have to ATTACK THE POLICE instead of reform them. Playing by the rules of the state by suing people through the legal system means we can never actualize radical communities distinct from governmental control. You can’t critique the state and defend the state.

## AT: Afropess

#### 1. Permutation, use the nomadic war machine to conduct a paradigmatic analysis. The alt is continuous questioning or burning down of the state, and my Kuhn evidence makes it pretty clear how pirates declared continual war on the state.

#### 2. Perm do both: Historically, piracy offered a chance of freedom for escaped slaves in the 18th century

**Do or die 99** Do or die, anarchist journal, “Pirate Utopias: Under the Banner of King Death” 1999. http://www.eco-action.org/dod/no8/pirate.html ES

However, not all pirates participated in the slave trade. Indeed large numbers of pirates were ex-slaves; there was a much higher proportion of blacks on pirate ships than on merchant or naval vessels, and only rarely did the observers who noted their presence refer to them as 'slaves'. Most of these black pirates would have been runaway slaves, either joining with the pirates on the course of the voyage from Africa, deserting from the plantation, or sent as slaves to work on board ship. Some may have been free men, like the "free Negro" seaman from Deptford who in 1721 led "a Mutiney that we had too many Officers, and that the work was too hard, and what not." Seafaring in general offered more autonomy to blacks than life on the plantation, but piracy in particular, could - although it was a risk – offer[ed] one of the few chances at freedom for an African in the 18th century Atlantic. For example, a quarter of the two-hundred strong crew of Captain Bellamy's ship the Whydah were black, and eyewitness accounts of the sinking of the pirate vessel off Wellfleet, Massachusetts in 1717 report that many of the corpses washed up were black. Pirate historian Kenneth Kinkor argues that although the Whydah was originally a slave ship, the blacks on board at the time of the sinking were members of the crew, not slaves. Partially because pirates, along with other tars, "entertain'd so contemptible a Notion of Landsmen," a black man who knew the ropes was more likely to win respect than a landsman who didn't. Kinkor notes: "Pirates judged Africans more on the basis of their language and sailing skills - in other words, on their level of cultural attainment - than on their race."(24)

#### 3. The K proves black life is impossible in America, not on the sea. There’s no ontological death for the black pirates because they exist in anarchist utopias outside of the state.

#### 4. Pirates interrupted and damaged the Atlantic Slave Trade which means that they independently interrupted the process of social deadening.

**Bialuschewski 8** Arne, history professor at Trent University in Ontario, Canada, “Black People under the Black Flag: Piracy and the Slave Trade on the West Coast of Africa, 1718–1723”, published in volume 29 of “Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies” 2008. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01440390802486473#tabModule ES

Meanwhile, piracy caused extensive damage to British, Dutch, French and Portuguese shipping in Africa. According to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade database, 124 vessels that reached the west coast of Africa in 1719 made it safely on to America.34 At the same time there were 47 documented seizures of slave vessels, but due to the fragmentary nature of the evidence the real figure was most likely much higher.35 The French authorities in the Caribbean, for example, estimated that more than 100 mostly English vessels had been captured by pirates, and a London newspaper published a list of 84 vessels that had been seized off the west coast of Africa.36 Although many traders were able to resume their voyage across the Atlantic after being plundered by pirates, the slave trade suffered heavy losses. Presumably based on insurance figures, it was claimed that pirates had taken ships and cargoes valued at £204,000 on the Guinea coast in 1719.37 This was an enormous sum in the early eighteenth century.

The effects of pirate depredations were felt in the New World in particular. In September 1719 the intendant of Martinique claimed that no slaves had reached the island for almost two years.38 Even if this statement exaggerates the situation, there was clearly a slump in the number of slaves that arrived in the Lesser Antilles. One month later a merchant in Barbados wrote: ‘Negroes happen to be Dear now, from [the] Vast Number the Pyrates have taken upon [the] Coast of Guinea that were Intended for our Island’ and ‘The Price of Slaves is now Extravagantly High, there having been but one Sale for a Considerable Time, & those [were] Angolians which are Deem'd the Worst Sort’.39 Merchants pressed the authorities in London to protect shipping, but the threat from pirates did not stop them from sending their vessels to Africa. To them, piracy was akin to the known risks of shipwreck and slave mortality. Many traders dealt with risk by insuring their vessels and cargoes as well as spreading out their investments.40 With increased risk usually came a substantial profit margin, and there may have been some lucky merchants who made a fortune.

## AT: Fem

#### 1. No link. Pirates were not sexist assholes like society thinks they were. If you raped a female captive, you got thrown off the boat. That’s Land 7.

#### **2. Many pirates were women. Specifically, Zheng Shi, who was the coolest pirate ver.**

[Szczepanski](http://asianhistory.about.com/bio/Kallie-Szczepanski-40912.htm) No Date (Kallie [Szczepanski](http://asianhistory.about.com/bio/Kallie-Szczepanski-40912.htm), Historian, “Zheng Shi, Pirate Lady of China” <http://asianhistory.about.com/od/modernchina/p/Zheng-Shi-Pirate-China.htm>)CEFS

The most successful pirate in history was not [Blackbeard](http://latinamericanhistory.about.com/od/historyofthecaribbean/a/Biography-Of-Edward-Blackbeard-Teach.htm) (Edward Teach) or Barbarossa, but Zheng Shi or Ching Shih of [China](http://asianhistory.about.com/od/china/p/ChinaProfile.htm). She acquired great wealth, ruled the South China Seas, and best of all, survived to enjoy the spoils.¶ We know next to nothing about Zheng Shi's early life. In fact, "Zheng Shi" means simply "widow Zheng" - we don't even know her birth name. She was likely born in 1775, but the other details of her childhood are lost to history.¶ **Zheng Shi's Marriage:**¶She first enters the historical record in 1801. The beautiful young woman was working as a prostitute in a Canton brothel when she was captured by pirates. Zheng Yi, a famous pirate fleet admiral, claimed the captive to be his wife. She pluckily agreed to marry the pirate leader only if certain conditions were met. She would be an equal partner in leadership of the pirate fleet, and half the admiral's share of the plunder would be hers. Zheng Shi must have been extremely beautiful and persuasive, because Zheng Yi agreed to these terms.¶ Over the next six years, the Zhengs built a powerful coalition of Cantonese pirate fleets. Their combined force consisted of six color-coded fleets, with their own "Red Flag Fleet" in the lead. Subsidiary fleets included the Black, White, Blue, Yellow, and Green.¶ In April of 1804, the Zhengs instituted a blockade of the Portuguese trading port at [Macau](http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blcmacau.htm). Portugal sent a battle squadron against the pirate armada, but the Zhengs promptly defeated the Portuguese. Britain intervened, but did not dare take on the full might of the pirates - the British Royal Navy simply began providing naval escorts for British and allied shipping in the area.¶ On November 16, 1807, Zheng Yi died in [Vietnam](http://asianhistory.about.com/od/vietnam/p/Vietnam-Facts-And-History.htm), which was in the throes of the Tay Son Rebellion. At the time of his death, his fleet is estimated to have included 400 to 1200 ships, depending upon the source, and 50,000 to 70,000 pirates.¶ As soon as her husband died, Zheng Shi began calling in favors and consolidating her position as the head of the pirate coalition. She was able, through political acumen and willpower, to bring all of her husband's pirate fleets to heel. Together they controlled the trade routes and fishing rights all along the coasts of Guangdong, China and Vietnam.¶ **Zheng Shi, Pirate Lord:**¶Zheng Shi was as ruthless with her own men as she was with captives. She instituted a strict code of conduct, and enforced it strictly. All goods and money seized as booty was presented to the fleet and registered before being redistributed. The capturing ship received 20% of the loot, and the rest went into a collective fund for the entire fleet. Anyone who withheld plunder faced whipping; repeat offenders or those who concealed large amounts would be beheaded.¶ A former captive herself, Zheng Shi also had very strict rules about treatment of female prisoners. Pirates could take beautiful captives as their wives or concubines, but they had to remain faithful to them and take care of them - unfaithful husbands would be beheaded. Likewise, any pirate who raped a captive was executed. Ugly women were to be released unharmed and free of charge on shore.¶ Pirates who deserted their ship would be pursued, and if found, had their ears cut off. The same fate awaited any who went absent without leave, and the earless culprits would then be paraded in front of the entire squadron. Using this code of conduct, Zheng Shi built a pirate empire in the South China Sea that is unrivaled in history for its reach, fearsomeness, communal spirit, and wealth.¶ In 1806, the [Qing dynasty](http://asianhistory.about.com/od/glossaryps/g/GlosQingDynasty.htm) decided to do something about Zheng Shi and her pirate empire. They sent an armada to fight the pirates, but Zheng Shi's ships quickly sank 63 of the government's naval ships, sending the rest packing. Both Britain and Portugal declined to directly intervene against "The Terror of the South China Seas." Zheng Shi had humbled the navies of three world powers.

#### 4. Women used piracy as a way to find freedom from restrictive gender roles

**Do or die 99** Do or die, anarchist journal, “Pirate Utopias: Under the Banner of King Death” 1999. http://www.eco-action.org/dod/no8/pirate.html ES

Just as pirates in general defined themselves in opposition to the emerging capitalist social relations of the 17th and 18th centuries, so also some women found in piracy a way to rebel against the emerging gender roles. For example, Charlotte de Berry, born in England in 1636, followed her husband into the navy by dressing as a man. When she was forced aboard an Africa-bound vessel, she led a mutiny against the captain who had assaulted her, cutting off his head with a dagger. She then turned pirate and became captain, her ship cruising the African coast capturing gold ships. There were also other less successful women pirates; in Virginia in 1726, the authorities tried Mary Harley (or Harvey) and three men for piracy. The three men were sentenced to hang but Harley was released. Mary's husband Thomas was also involved in the piracy but seems to have escaped capture. Mary and her husband had been transported to the colonies as convicts a year earlier. Three years later in 1729, another deported female convict was on trial for piracy in the colony of Virginia. A gang of six pirates were sentenced to hang, including Mary Crickett (or Crichett), who along with Edmund Williams, the leader of the pirate gang, had been transported to Virginia as a felon in 1728.(37)

## AT: Cap

#### Permutation, do both. Pirates were effectively able to challenge capitalism by forming egalitarian utopian communities and rejecting government capitalist systems of property based on land. Any land-based method to solve capitalism has historically failed otherwise.

#### The way the criticism looks at resistance to capitalism is inherently flawed. There can be no escape or liberation because the power of capital is that it always adds in more axioms to reify its power. Pirates, however, let us become parasites to the system, in which we are autonomous from capitalism which allows us to have the starting point for real resistance.

Kuhn 97 (Gabriel Kuhn, independent author and translator in Stockholm, Sweden, Philosophy PhD. from the University of Innsbruck, “Life Under Death’s Head, Anarchism and Piracy” pp. 273-74. Originally published as an essay in Women Pirates.)CEFS

Pirates produced nothing with which to earn their livelihood. They robbed others. Pirates accumulated no capital; they squandered everything. Their victims were mostly merchant ships. Pirates “caused such great damage to ship travel that normal commercial traffic, and even the economies of a few countries were greatly endangered. It made no difference whether a ship flew under a Spanish, French, English, Indian, or Arabian flag. The pirates opposed all states, and any ship was acceptable as booty. Pirates threatened capitalism. Instead of a circulation of production and consumption, they set up one of robbery and squander. What pirates did is comparable to the burning of a factory by autonomen; except that in the process pirates also took everything they needed for survival. The basis of their livelihood was “redistribution.” It comes as no surprise that the decisive campaign of extermination against the pirates was ultimately sounded by an association of English merchants. ¶ Commercial concerns are powerful, and belong to the society of the State. Capitalism is totalitarian. It is clear that the pirates, without naming it as their enemy, and certainly without analyzing it, nonetheless had to fight it. They lived off the attempt to establish capitalism, at the same time blocking that attempt.¶ Why not just walk away from capitalism and build “something else,” something “independent” (perhaps communes or something similarly libertarian and romantic)? Now that is something easier said than done. In fact, it is as good as impossible. The combination of fighting capitalism while also exploiting it is admittedly far more exciting and intensive than mere escape. But finally, it is in the nature of capitalism that there can be no escape; it will always catch up. “The potency of capitalism consists in a logic that is never saturated, and always prepared to add on more axioms to the existing ones.” Thus: let’s go get’em and see what comes of it!”—the pirate as parasite. Such parasitic groups have always created relatively free spaces within capitalism, broken through its constitutive chains, established a connection to the outside, and allowed for (more or less) autonomous living. The question is not how capitalism can be done away with, nor that of what should replace it. The question is: how can I deal with it so as not to become a prisoner? Everything else will follow from that.¶ Pirates always behaved this way. Perhaps the only true forerunners to Caribbean piracy were the Hanseatic pirates grouped around Klaus Storetbeker (“the Vitalien brothers”). They too did not want to have their lives dictated by rulers and merchants. When these tried to consolidate their power in the Hanseatic area, Stortebeker and his friends made the North Sea into their home. The life they lived was not dictated by the Hanseatic order, but their livelihood was based upon Hanseatic trade: they robbed the merchants. “’Enemies of all the world, friends only of God,’ according to the legend of the Vitalien brothers. At least this would mean that God was in favor of robbing rich merchants, of taking from the power ful that which they would probably not give freely.”¶ There is much to talk about fighting capitalism. Pirates show us how to do it.

**Link turn – the 1ac’s political approach is exactly what \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ advocates – we affirm a tactics of continual responsiveness and reflexivity – our nomadic politics can respond to change more effectively than traditional approaches to debate – that’s Kuhn**

**The presumption that they can know exactly how the state will respond to our kritik reflects a flawed attitude toward the future. They presume that the future can be known and predictably controlled, this justifies expunging all uncertainty from political calculation**

**Their evidence is about abstract theorization not pragmatic action, the aff’s embrace of uncertainty prepares us to approach decision-making in a pragmatic, realistic way – that’s Kuhn**

Permutation vote aff to stop cap : Pirates only gained money to fritter it away. The outright refusal of economic gain and accumulation of wealth shows that piracy is a powerfully successful strategy for escaping capitalism.

Klausman, Meinzerin, and Kuhn 97 (Marion Meinzerin, professor of history at Cambridge University, Gabriel Kuhn, freelance writer, Ulrike Klausman, freelance journalist, “Women Pirates And the Politics of the Jolly Roger” trans. By Tyler Austin and Nicholas Levis p. 260-262)

The captain, like the chief, had the function of keeping a larder. **What did the rest of the pirates do with their shares of the booty? The answer is simple. As soon as they were on land, they acquired everything they needed for survival in the next weeks. The rest was used to eat, drink, pay whores and play cards for a few days, until there was nothing left. Then it was time to set sail again. "The sea robbers nearly always gave away their...money on land as quickly as they had got it. Among sea robbers money reached the highest speed of circulation ever recorded in the whole of economic history**."105

**The potlatch finds its counterpart in the much-celebrated buried treasure: "In contrast to merchants**, they [**the pirates] assigned no special value to money**. **Many a pirate hid [Their]-h-i-s- robbed jewels, gold coins, and other gems on uninhabited and inhospitable islands**. Thus one or another pirate treasure is suxely still buried in. the sand of some Caribbean island, or on Madagascar."106 **A pirate never withdrew with the booty to safety to begin a "new life." "Most pirates died at sea**, and the sea became their grave."107 The rest were hanged on. "exe­cution deck**." The tours of plunder were a necessary and beloved part of their way of life, receiving the greatest, atten­tion from all sides. But they never served the acquisition of wealth. "Their concern was not to plunder in order to become rich. Their goal instead, was to gain booty as quickly as possi­ble with, the least possible effort, so as to fritter it away just as quickly.**"108 Exactly herein lies the distinction between true pirates and all other sea robbers**. Like all societies without States, pirates knew nothing of economics, possessions, or capital accumulation. Not that they were too stupid, lazy, or weak to develop such economics. Pirates, of all people, could have ended up among the richest men of that time, but riches meant little to a pirate. The reason was that modern economy consists in meaningless production for the sake of production, and therefore requires States, power, exploita­tion, class society. The pirate holds property in contempt, because it has nothing to do with his desire for freedom. Actually, it is an obstacle to that desire. The pirate is well aware of the danger that the accumulation of goods repre­sents to a life in freedom and equality, meaning to the whole of pirate society.**

Like primitive societies**, pirates are "societies without economy out of a refusal of economy.**"109

**Floating PIK’s are bad because they turn pirates into privateers – instead of the enemy of all, the alternative creates a movement that is only situated to oppose certain structures of fascism**

**We are the fog of war – the tactical stance of darting in and out of the margins of state power equips us with the tools to affirm life and challenge the state without being consumed by it – that’s Bey.**

**The K appropriates and ultimately eliminates Islam from their political project – risks fascism and religious violence- The aff is key to eliminate Facism**

Almond 9 – Ian, Bosphorus University, Istanbul, “Two Versions of Islam and the Apocalypse: The Persistence of Eschatology in Schlegel, Baudrillard and Zizek,” JOURNAL FOR CULTURAL RESEARCH, VOLUME 13, NUMBERS 3–4, (JULY–OCTOBER 2009) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14797580903101227>)

If Schlegel and Baudrillard belonged to a tradition which saw Muslims as signposts, Zizek sees them as possibilities. In The Ticklish Subject, he recalls American ] media coverage of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Western viewers saw Dan Rather reporting the event live in front of a copy of the Statue of Liberty; “in short”, comments Zizek, “if you scratch the yellow skin of a Chinese, you find ] AQ15 an American” (Zizek, p. 207). Zˇiˇzek’s scorn, clearly, is for those Western 25 Z[caorn] commentators who automatically translate any desire for freedom, anywhere in the world, as the desire for a Western, free market, liberal democracy. Within Zizek’s texts, however, a similar, though not so explicit process takes place; ] there are enough references to the Baader-Meinhof group and a “Muslim International” (Zizek 2004, p. 18) to suggest that in Zˇiˇzek’s work, if we scratch the skin Z[caorn] of a Muslim, sooner or later we find a socialist underneath. Certainly, phrases such as “the Western recolonization of the East” (Zizek, ] AQ16 p. 206) draw fully on the bipolar ambiguities, both Soviet and Oriental, a term such as “the East” contains for Zizek. A common opposition to Western capitalism, unsurprisingly, brings both Slavic and Muslim, both materialist and transcendental Orients together in a common stand against US hegemony. And yet, this common tendency to lump together the left-wing protester and the Muslim radical as two equally discordant elements in the nouveau ordre mondial is not the main reason why Zizek views the phenomenon of global ] Islam with such an interesting mixture of speculation and hope: instead of celebrating the greatness of true Islam against its misuse by funda- mentalist terrorists, or bemoaning the fact that, of all the great religions, Islam is the most resistant to modernization, one should, rather, conceive of this resistance as an open chance, as “undecidable": this resistance does not necessarily lead to “Islamo-Fascism”, it can also be articulated into a socialist project. Precisely because Islam harbours the “worst” potentials of the Fascist answer to our present predicament, it can also turn out to be the site for the “best”. In other words, yes, Islam is indeed not a religion like the others, it does involve a stronger social link, it does resist integration into the capitalist global order – and the task is to work out how to use this ambiguous fact politically. (ˇZiˇzek 2004, pp. 48–49) A large portion of the passage has been repeated from Welcome to the Desert zca[orn] of the Real (Zizek 2002), with some adjustments (the insistence that “we ] should agree with” Fukuyama’s definition of “Islamo-Fascism” has been dropped [Zizek 2002, p. 133]). Precisely that which makes Islam “other” — its ] anti-modernity, its stronger and more cohesive sense of collectivity, its resort to radical violence — is proposed as an integral part of a future “socialist project”. Zizek, in his praise of Paulinian universality and the irrational passion ] of the Zionist attachment to Israel, has already performed this gesture of a selective political appropriation of the premodern with regard to the Jewish and Christian legacy. What lends the passage an uncomfortable tone for a Muslim reader is the open way Zizek speaks of “using” Islam as a handy, minor ] component in a larger, geopolitical game. For all the theorist’s good intentions — and Zizek has many of them — there is something unsettlingly colonial, perhaps even corporate, about the chess-like way Islam is discussed here, its “potential” considered, its positives and negatives carefully weighed (the passage is also reminiscent of Marx’s [1968] own belief, expressed in 1853, that the Turk “must be got rid of” in order to bring European progress to Ottoman Asia Minor). Whatever Islam might be, modern or not, its value clearly lies as an intermediate stage towards something else, an ancillary motion or transition phase towards some even more desirable outcome. Regardless of what form of socialism this outcome will entail, it is difficult to avoid the fact that Islam will vanish within it. Zizek’s remark that Islam is ] distinguished from its sister religions by the fact that it “resist[s] integration into the capitalist global order” does call to mind his own considerations on the Jamesonian concept of the “vanishing mediator” — the mechanism by which a belief may facilitate the emergence of another belief system, and render itself ] obsolete in the process. In For They Know Not What They Do, Zizek relates how the “Protestant universalization of the Christian stance” was merely a “transi- tory stage” to a bourgeois individualist society which, once it had incorporated and secularized Protestant values, subsequently relegated religion to a mere private matter, a “means” to better economic performance. Protestant Chris- tianity, having “mediated” the passage from medieval feudalism to bourgeois capitalism, effectively “vanishes” within it. If Zizek sees Islam, at least in the ] above passage, as something which essentially resists this process, a different version of the same fate (“vanishing” this time within socialism, not capitalism) appears to be offered as the only alternative to “Islamo-Fascism”. Within this “socialist project”, it would seem, Islam would vanish from society in much the same way as the Muslim faith of the Calvinists’ sultan would after his conversion at the gates of Rome.

**No impact – there’s no coherent implication to the link which means even if they do win a risk of a case turn the perm should solve it.**

**Vague alts are a voter for fairness because they make the neg a moving target which skews our ability to generate offense.**